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REBUTTAL ARGUMENT
I
NON-COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 4
RENDERS THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT VOID
Plaintiffs argue

[p. 5 of their brief] that the

Appellant (Defendant) must overcome the "giant hurdle"
(Plaintiffs' term) of establishing the Defendant was not
2

personally

served

with

the

summons.

Plaintiff

misconstrues who actually has the "giant hurdle". It is
the Plaintiffs who must establish that he WAS VALIDLY
SERVED! Without proper service, there is no obligation to
appear and the judgment, entered in assumed "default", IS
VOID. Utah case law (Garcia vs Garcia, 712 P. 2d 288 (Utah
1986) allows an attack

through Rule 60(b)(7)

to be

made at any time, BECAUSE THE JUDGMENT IS VOID!
Proper service of process IS JURISDICTIONAL to the
case!

Without

valid

service,

the

court

has

NO

JURISDICTION over the defendant and cannot enter a valid
judgment. A default judgment

entered upon the non-

appearance of an invalidly-served defendant

is VOID!

The case of Wisden vs Bangerter, 793 P. 2d 1057 (Utah
Supreme Court 1995) is clearly inappropriate. Wisden
involved

a plaintiff,

who

knew

his

case

had

been

adjudicated! That plaintiff was simply late in bringing
his appeal. In this case, it is the Defendant
because

of the defective

brought into the proceedings

who,

service, was not properly
who has a very legitimate

reason to challenge the void judgment!
Plaintiffs' Brief [pp. 6-7] mistates the facts and
misrepresent the law on the issue of the "usual place of
abode". That phrase is one of legal significance! As used
in Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and as
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that phrase has been historically interpreted [Grant vs
Lawrence, 37 Utah 450, 108 Pac. 931 (1910)] and applied
to be the location where the person resides at the time
he is actually served. The Defendant

at the time of

service of the summons (28 September 1992) was NOT living
in Missouri at the Appleton address with his wife; he was
LIVING IN TEXAS. This fact is (was) implicitly admitted
by counsel in his letter to the Missouri sheriff, even
before service of process was attempted.
That the Defendant attended [as described in page 8
of Plaintiff's Brief] a family barbecue in Missouri in
May 1992

THREE MONTHS BEFORE the defective service of

process was even attempted

is absolutely immaterial and

irrelevant to the instant issue. All that can be said
concerning the May 1992 family barbecue is that the
Defendant attended that barbecue! So what? The inference
might

but is not required to

be drawn that he lived

in Missouri. So what? That was in May! The simple fact
remains: the Defendant was not "personally served" at
"his usual place of abode", per Grant vs Lawrence, supra!
A fact implicitly admitted by Plaintiffs' counsel even
before the fact in his letter to the Missouri sheriff.
Plaintiffs' Brief [p. 9] is full of all kinds of
assumed

but not established

"facts", certainly not

material to the issue of the invalidity of service.
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Plaintiffs argue [p. 9-10 of their Brief] that they
are only required to use "reasonable efforts" to serve
process upon the Defendant. No! The Plaintiffs have the
burden of properly serving the defendant, according to
the standards prescribed by Rule 4 and interpreted by
cases such as Grant vs Lawrence, supra. The Plaintiffs'
citation to In re Schwenke, 865 P.2d 1350 (Utah Supreme
Court 1993) , is inappropriate, because it is obvious from
the case decision that Mr Schwenke was served and was
aware of the proceedings against him!
The Plaintiffs misread the effect and rationale of
Garcia vs Garcia, 712 P. 2d 288 (Utah Supreme Court 1990) .
Garcia was decided not because the Supreme Court was
"chagrined"
because

[Plaintiff's term, p. 10 of their Brief]

the

summons

could have been

left with the

defendant in that case; Garcia was decided on the basis
that the plaintiffs simply did NOT follow the clear
mandate of Rule 4 and the court thus had no jurisdiction
over the defendant! That's exactly what we have here:
Rule 4's prescriptions have not been followed! Nikki
the wife

was served; Steven

at the time

who was NOT living there

wasn't. Plaintiffs have an obligation to

insure that they caused to be served the right person in
the

right

manner;

otherwise,

the

court

is without

jurisdiction. That the Plaintiffs waited laterally until
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the last possible minute to attempt the service of
process cannot avail them when that service is invalidly
effected, because they served the wrong address.
The trial court is simply without jurisdiction over
the Defendant and any judgment entered against him is
void! Garcia, supra. See also Woody vs Rhodes, 461 P.2d
465 (Utah Supreme Court 1969).
II
THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT SHOULD BE SET ASIDE
The default judgment should be set aside

if only

on equitable principles. The Defendant did not appear
until he was properly notified
proceeding

that

Plaintiffs' brief

a

judgment

via the garnishment

had been

entered.

The

[p. 13] correctly acknowledges the

law's "preference" for trying cases on their merits. The
Plaintiffs' attempted character assassination of the
Defendant

through

repetitious

statements

concerning

alleged conduct or misconduct are immaterial to this
case, in which the Plaintiffs have simply not effected
service in the manner prescribed.
The underlying obligation is NOT, in theory, the
renewal of a judgment
pleaded

the

case),

(as Plaintiff has incorrectly

but

rather

whether

or

not

the

Defendant paid the mortgage requirements. The payment (or
non-payment) of mortgage obligations are established by
documentary evidence. We are dealing here not with a case
6

which

like a traffic accident

must of necessity deal

with witnesses' perceptions and recollections, which fade
with the passage of time. Plaintiffs have not claimed
nor, given their own lack of diligence in pursuing the
case

in

the

first

instance

any

disadvantage

or

prejudice due to the length of time. For the most part,
the delay in the case has been either of their own making
or certainly because of their own choice!
One must also wonder if a default judgment had been
entered against the Plaintiffs if they would be quite so
cavalier about arguing that "reasonable efforts" (in
attempted compliance with Rule 4) were sufficient basis
to uphold the default judgment against them.
Plaintiffs incorrectly assert [p. 14] that the Court
could

on "stipulation"

have amended the judgment and

issued it in the name of Laurel Caldwell. While such
might have been done had the Defendant actually been
there to so "stipulate", he wasn't there! Because he was
not

properly

served

and

was

proceeding! That the plaintiffs

not

notified

of

the

upon "stipulation"

might have been able to correct a lot of things in the
case does not overcome the Plaintiffs7 failure in the
fatal mistakes that they made!
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Ill
PLAINTIFFS' NON-COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 54(c) (2)
The Plaintiffs argue [pp. 13-14 of their Brief] that
the Defendant has not been prejudiced by the subtle
"switch" which was effected in the pleadings and the
judgment actually entered.
The issue is whether or not the Plaintiffs have
followed the Rules. Rule 54(c) (2) requires the judgment
to conform to the pleadings (complaint), by providing:
(2) Judgment by default. A judgment by default
shall not be different in kind from, or exceed
the amount, that specifically prayed for in the
demand for judgment.
Emphasis added.
The pleadings

(complaint) initially alleged the

action was brought by Nelda Wall "in behalf of the Estate
of Hal E Wall". The Plaintiffs admit [p. 13] that there
were

no

formal

probate

deceased. Thus, Nelda Wall

proceedings

for

Hal

Wall,

simply as surviving spouse--

-has no legal authority to bring an action "in behalf of
the estate" of her deceased husband, unless and until she
is lawfully appointed as Personal Representative or
Special Administrator pursuant to court order, entered
pursuant to the Probate Code [Title 75 of the Utah Code] .
The critical issue here is NOT whether there is an
"estate" of Hal E Wall; the dispositive issue is whether
or not Nelda

not legally appointed to do so
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may bring

and maintain an action "in behalf of the estate" of a
deceased person. She cannot!
Stevens vs Collard, 837 P. 2d 593

(Utah Court of

Appeals 1992), holds that the trial court is to examine
the face of the pleadings and decide whether or not a
default judgment can be supported. There are two reasons
in this case why the proffered "default judgment" cannot
be supported, from the face of the pleadings. First, it
should have been obvious to Judge Noel that the action
was not one to "renew" the previous divorce judgment,
that Nelda was not

and could not be

a party to that

original (1982) divorce "judgment", so as to be able to
"renew" the same. Secondly, it should have been obvious
that Nelda Wall had no legal authority to bring the
action "in behalf of the estate" of Hal Wall, deceased.
The Plaintiffs assert [p. 14 of their Brief] that
the trial court could "amend the judgment and issue it
into the name of plaintiff Laurel Caldwell, who could
assign the judgment to Nelda F Wall." While this could
possibly have been done

had the Defendant been there

and had the Defendant agreed, which is NOT the case

the

fact remains that it was not so done!
That the default judgment "does nothing more than
implement the practicalities of the situation in an
equitable way" [p. 14 of Plaintiffs7 Brief] is incorrect.
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Rule

54(c)(2)

requires

strict

conformity

with

the

original pleadings; otherwise, the whole integrity of the
system is subject to abuse.
That the Plaintiffs are now willing to have no
objection to an amendment of the default judgment to be
issued in name of Laurel Caldwell does not correct the
errors Plaintiffs have made. In fact, this statement
alone implicitly acknowledges the correctness of the
Defendant's assertions: that Nelda F Wall is not the
correct party to be bringing the action. Thus, the
default judgment entered in her name (Nelda F Wall) is,
for the foregoing reasons, facially defective and cannot
be allowed to stand.
CONCLUSION
The Court DOES have jurisdiction, at any time, to
entertain a motion to set aside a VOID JUDGMENT
default judgment

even a

improperly entered because of a lack

of personal service, as required by Rule 4. Garcia,
supra. The summons was NOT served upon the Defendant
Steven D Caldwell "at his usual place of abode", which,
per Grant vs Lawrence is the place he was living at the
time service was made; it was served upon Nikki, at her
residence. Rule 4 has not been complied with; the default
judgment is simply void!
The default

judgment ought to be set aside on
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equitable grounds. The Defendant has not had "his day in
court", has promptly responded when he first became aware
of the proceeding, and the Plaintiffs' have claimed no
prejudice in trying the case on the merits. Most
all

if not

of the delay is attributable to the inaction of the

Plaintiffs.
Nelda F Wall

not being legally appointed as the

Personal Representative

has no authority to bring an

action "in behalf of the estate" of any deceased person!
The judgment is facially defective. The Plaintiffs' noncompliance with Rule 54(c) (2) further makes the default
judgment defective.
The

trial

court's

decision

(to

uphold

the

previously-entered default judgment) must be overturned.
Respectfully submitted this 11th day of September,
1997.

Attorney for Appellant
STEVEN D CALDWELL
CERTIFICATE
I certify that I caused two copies of the foregoing
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF to be mailed to Mr Delano S
Findlay, Attorney at Law, 923 East 5350 South, Suite E,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117, this llth day of September,
1997.
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